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International Human Rights Law in Soviet and
American Courts
Lori Fisler Dam roscht

To what extent should domestic courts apply international law-specifically
the international law of human rights? I would like to examine this question
with reference to two very different states: the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and the United States. For quite distinct reasons, neither of the two
has yet fully embraced the idea of direct application in national tribunals of the
body of international law that regulates the relationship between human beings
and their own governments. As the post-Cold War era unfolds, it is time to ask
whether either or both of these erstwhile adversaries might finally be ready for
full-fledged implementation of international human rights law in national courts.
The Soviet Union is going through such profound political and constitutional change that specific comments run the risk of obsolescence or irrelevancy.
In early 1991, when this Essay was in preparation, the breakup of the Union
came to seem inevitable, but what will emerge cannot yet be foreseen. Retrogressive developments have cast doubt on the prospects for advancing the rule
of law under the current Soviet leadership. Nonetheless, I believe that the issue
of domestic application of international human rights law will survive the
current tumultuous period and will figure in the disposition of transcendent
constitutional issues.
The idea of consolidating domestic protection of international human rights
is on the ascendant everywhere in the Soviet Union. If the Union splits up into
sovereign states consisting of the present republics or comparable units, then
the resulting entities will themselves have to deal with the issues explored in
this Essay. They may well go about that effort more vigorously than the Union
itself. Indeed, the republics, one after another, in their declarations of sovereignty and constitutional documents, have proclaimed commitment to the principles
of international law guaranteeing human rights and fundamental freedoms.' If
the Union survives, its leaders will not be able to ignore the demands of the
t Professor of Law, Columbia University. The author thanks John N. Hazard, Louis Henkin, Peter H.
Juviler, Rein Mullerson, and Gerald L. Neuman for their comments; Mary Holland, Nikolai Krylov, and
Vratislav Pechota for materials on recent Soviet developments; and Jonathan W. Narins and Daniel P. Penn,
whose capabilities in Russian made them especially valuable research assistants.
1. See infra text accompanying note 45.
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people for institutions to implement internationally protected rights.2 The
problem of assuring compliance with international obligations concerning
human rights is high on the agenda of those preparing new constitutional drafts,
and the recently established Committee of Constitutional Supervision has been
given a mandate to apply international human rights instruments.3 Thus, the
issue of domestic implementation of international human rights law figures
prominently in political as well as legal debate,4 even as controversy swirls
over what kind of state-or states-will rise from the ruins of the Soviet Union.
With hindsight, it is easy to see that the international human rights movement helped bring about the changes sweeping the Soviet Union; it will require
foresight to develop structures capable of consolidating gains achieved in the
human rights field. One such institutional initiative should be movement toward
application of international human rights law in domestic tribunals.5
In the pages that follow, I first survey the principal sources of international
human rights law as they pertain to the Soviet Union and the United States. I
then examine the legal infrastructure for giving effect to international law in
the Soviet Union, and I note contrasts to the analogous infrastructure in the
United States. 6 The positions taken by these two states reflect quite different
attitudes toward law, toward lawmaking processes, and toward the role of courts
in applying law. These different attitudes directly affect the two nations'
respective approaches to the international law of human rights.
The Soviet Union is at a historical juncture where all prior tenets are open
for reexamination, and international human rights law may be able to exert an
2. The formulation of the referendum on national unity held in March of 1991 is illustrative: "Do you
consider it necessary to preserve the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a renewed federation of equal
sovereign republics, in which the rightsandfreedoms ofpeople ofany nationalitywill be fully guaranteed?"
See N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1991, at A 1,col. 6 (emphasis added). The leadership's draft of a new Union treaty
calls upon the republics to recognize "as the most important principle of their association, the priority of
human rights proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of the United Nations and in international covenants."
Union Treaty: Draft, Third Fundamental Principle [hereinafter Union Treaty Draft] (on file with author).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 54-7 1.
4. See, e.g., Vereshchetin, Danilenko & Mullerson, KonstitutsionnaiareformavSSSR imezhdunarodnoe
pravo (ConstitutionalReform in the USSR and InternationalLaw), SOVETSKOE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO
(SOVIET STATE AND LAW), No. 5, 1990, at 13 Uournal, hereinafter Soy. Cos. & PRA O]; Vereshchetin &
Mullerson, Primatmezhdunarodnogoprava v mirovoi politike (The Primacy of InternationalLaw in World
Politics), Soy. Gos. & PRAVO, No. 7, 1989, at 3.
5. My argument applies with equal force to the Soviet Union if it survives as a political entity, or to
any future states that may emerge out of a breakup or reorganization.
6. The present readership is presumed to be familiar with the relevant concepts in U.S. law. For a
summary, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 111-115

(1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]; see also Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A
Century ofChinese Exclusion andIts Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853,863-85 (1987); Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MIcH. L. REV. 1555 (1984). I will confine myself to issues that
bear examination in light of developments in the Soviet Union.
This Essay concentrates on application of international human rights law against a state in its own
courts and thus does not deal with the problem of suing one state or its officials in the courts of another.
A few plaintiffs have sought to invoke the aid of U.S. courts to require the Soviet Union to comply with
international human rights law. Compare Frolova v. USSR, 761 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1985) (emigration) with
Von Dardel v. USSR, 623 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1985), dismissed, 736 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1990) (personal
security).
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unprecedented influence. At the same time, the transformations in the Soviet
Union provide an opportune moment for reconsideration of arguments used to
oppose U.S. ratification of human rights treaties. The United States, along with
the Soviet Union, should discard Cold War attitudes in the domestic legal
sphere as well as in international relations, and should rise to the challenge of
providing legal guarantees for the implementation of internationally protected
rights.
I. OVERVIEW OF SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

International human rights law is a vast field, and the United States and the
Soviet Union have typically emphasized quite different aspects of it. Substantively, its content ranges across the panoply of civil and political rights cherished in the Western European and American traditions as well as the economic
and social rights favored by the Soviet Union and other socialist states-from
the right to speak one's mind to the "right" to periodic holidays with pay.7
Because claimants in domestic tribunals are typically expected to show where
a claimed right comes from and why it is legally binding, I will be more concerned with the formal pedigree of internationally protected rights than with
their substantive content. A U.S.-Soviet comparison will show that the two
countries differ not only in the extent to which they have endorsed the various
human rights documents, but also in their attitudes toward the different sources
of international law.
In terms of formal sources, international human rights law is found in
single-issue, quasi-universal treaties such as the Genocide Convention;' general,
multilateral treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights9 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights; t0 regional treaties such as the European Convention on Human
Rights;" resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly such as the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights; 2 political pledges such as the Helsinki Accords;' 3 and that most elusive species of all, customary international law.'4

7. For a catalogue of most internationally recognized rights, see Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/8 10 (1948). The rights referred to in the text are found in the Declaration
in Articles 19 and 24.
8. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, S. EXEC.
Doc. 0, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1949), 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
9. Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
10. Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
11. [European] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention].
12. Supra note 7.
13. Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Final Act (Helsinki Accords), Aug. 1, 1975,
14 I.L.M. 1292.
14. See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 702 (containing short list of practices considered
violative of customary international law of human rights).

2318

The Yale Law Journal

[Vol. 100: 2315

These various sources are of differing legal significance, and some are more
likely to be enforced in domestic courts than others.
A snapshot of U.S. and Soviet adherence to the foregoing categories of
instruments would show that the Soviet Union has become party to most of the
major U.N.-sponsored treaties and the United States to only a few. 5 The
United States has recently entered reservations requiring specific future consent
in order to invoke the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice to
resolve disputes arising under certain human rights treaties,' 6 while the Soviet
Union has recently withdrawn comparable reservations previously made with
respect to half a dozen such treaties.' 7 Neither state has yet accepted the
optional procedures under which individuals could press treaty-based claims
before international bodies.' s Concerning regional activities, neither state is
currently a party to the human rights conventions pertaining to its geographic
region-the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms in the case of the Soviet Union, and the American
Convention on Human Rights in the case of the United States. 9 Both states
participate in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE)
which produced the Helsinki Accords in 197520 and which has, more recently,

15. For a chart of 24 major human rights instruments, see U.N. CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, UNITED
NATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS: STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, Mar. 1, 1990, at 12-13, U.N. Doc.

ST/HR/5, U.N. Sales No. E.87.XIV.2 (1987 & chart 1990). The USSR is party to 14 of the 24 instruments,
and the United States only to 7 as of the chart's cutoff date. (Subsequently, the U.S. Senate approved ratification of the Torture Convention.) Treaties to which the Soviet Union but not the United States is a party
include both of the major International Covenants, supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text, as well as
conventions against racial discrimination, apartheid, and discrimination against women.
16. Concerning the Torture Convention, see infra note 18; concerning the Genocide Convention, see
132 CONG. REC. S 1377 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1986). These reservations were adopted in the aftermath of the
rulings against the United States in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392 (Nov. 26) (jurisdiction), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) (merits), which provoked the
U.S. government to reassess its position with respect to the Court's compulsory and treaty-based jurisdiction.
For background on the U.S. reconsideration, see THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS
xvii-xxviii (L. Damrosch ed. 1987).
17. See Soviet Union Accepts Compulsory Jurisdiction of ICJfor Six Human Rights Conventions, 83
AM. J. INT'L L. 457 (1989).
18. Such procedures exist, inter alia, in the form of an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. in giving advice and consent to ratification
of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened
for signature Feb. 4, 1985, G.A. Res. 39/46,39 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 51 at 197, U.N. Doc. A/RESI39/708
(1984), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984) [hereinafter Torture Convention], the U.S. Senate approved a
declaration pursuant to Article 21(l) allowing claims by other states, but the U.S. administration did not
seek authority for the optional declaration under Article 22 on individual petitions. See 136 CONG. REC.
S 17,491-92 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990). Since only states can be parties to cases before the International Court,
see Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 34(1), 59 Stat. 1055, 1059 T.S. 933, that Court does
not provide a forum for individual petitions.
19. The European Convention, supra note i1, is open to members of the Council of Europe (art. 66).
The Soviet Union and other East European states are not members of the Council; how they might qualify
is an issue of some uncertainty and controversy. According to Article 3 of the Statute of the Council of
Europe, May 5, 1949, 87 U.N.T.S. 103, 106, every member "must accept the principles of the rule of law
and of the enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms."
Concerning the American Convention on Human Rights, see 9 I.L.M. 101, 673 (1970).
20. Supra note 13.
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adopted major new statements of human rights principles-at Vienna in 1988
and at Copenhagen and Paris in 1990.21 These undertakings, however, are
generally considered "political" rather than "legal." '
Treaty ratification is not the only method for giving legal life to international human rights law. In the United States, advocates have adopted creative
strategies in attempting to infuse concepts of the international movement into
American jurisprudence, but their success has been limited.23 Without attempting to do justice to the burgeoning scholarship in this area, I draw attention to
efforts to use international concepts as part of the backdrop for constitutional
interpretation, 24 as well as efforts to establish that certain human rights norms
have crystallized into customary law binding on all states, even those that have
not ratified the relevant treaties.25 The efforts to implement international
human rights law in the Soviet Union have taken a substantially different
approach and will be examined in detail below.
II.

SOVIET APPROACHES TO APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

A. Background
It is a fair generalization to say that Soviet courts have little experience in
applying international law, whether derived from treaties or otherwise. The idea
of international law as part of "the law of the land," while familiar to Western
lawyers, is foreign to Soviet jurisprudence. To be sure, the 1977 Soviet Constitution declared that "the USSR's relations with other states are based on...
fulfillment in good faith of obligations arising from the generally recognised
principles and rules of international law, and from the international treaties
signed by the USSR."26 But in contrast to the United States, where treaties
21. CSCE: Concluding Document from the Vienna Meeting, Nov. 4, 1986-Jan. 17, 1989, 28 I.L.M.
527; CSCE: Document of the CopenhagenMeeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension, June 29,

1990, 29 I.L.M. 1305 [hereinafter Copenhagen Documentl; Charterof Parisfor a New Europe, Nov. 21,
1990, 30 I.L.M. 193.
22. Russell, The Helsinki Declaration:Brobdingnag or Lilliput?, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 242, 246-49

(1976); Schachter, The Twilight Existence ofNonbinding InternationalAgreements, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 296,
296-97 (1977). Soviet scholars concur that the Helsinki Final Act is considered politically rather than legally
binding. See Mullerson, Sources of internationalLaw: New Tendencies in Soviet Thinking, 83 AM. J. INT'L
L. 494, 509-12 (1989).
23. See Tolley, Interest GroupLitigation to Enforce Human Rights, 105 POL. Sci. Q. 617 (1990-1991).
24. E.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 n.31 (1988) (plurality opinion referring to
international practice as relevant to decision on unconstitutionality of applying death penalty statutes to
crimes committed by juveniles). But see id. at 868-69 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (attacking plurality's
reliance on international sources as "totally inappropriate"); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 n.1
(1989) (majority opinion by Scalia dismissing relevance of international practice).
25. E.g., Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Ferrer-Mazorra v.
Meese, 479 U.S. 889 (1986) (undocumented aliens invoked customary norm against prolonged detention).
The human rights provisions of the United Nations Charter have generally been treated as non-self-executing.
See, e.g., Sei Fujii v. California, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 720-25, 242 P.2d 617, 619-22 (1952).
26. KONST. SSSR art. 29 (1977) (USSR Constitution), reprinted in 18 CONSTIrtrrIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 25 (A. Blaustein & G. Flanz eds. 1990).

2320

The Yale Law Journal

[Vol. 100: 2315

are declared to be the "supreme Law of the Land"27 and where federal courts
are given constitutional and statutory jurisdiction over cases arising under
treaties,2" Soviet courts have not been given explicit authority to apply international law as a direct source of law. Rather, the 1977 Constitution conferred
the function of implementing international law upon the Council of Ministers,
which is an executive organ, 29 and upon the respective subsidiary organs that
have competence over the subject matter in question.3" While Soviet scholars
have pointed out that it is not entirely correct to say that Soviet courts have
never applied international law, the few contrary examples that they cite would
31
strike Western lawyers as inconsequential.

The Soviet reluctance to apply international law in national tribunals may
be traced to several factors. First, the Soviet system has hardly been hospitable
to the idea of the rule of law as a control over official action; rather, law has
been viewed instrumentally-as a tool for building and maintaining a socialist
order.32 Only with the advent of perestroika and glasnost' have there been
serious gestures in the direction of bringing the state itself under the rule of
law.3 3 Just as there has been no tradition of constitutional control in the Soviet
Union (or in the Russian empire), the idea of applying international law to
change what elites or bureaucrats would otherwise do is an alien notion.
Second, there is no legal culture of an independent judiciary to give effect to
rules that would constrain the government. Rather, Soviet courts and judges
have typically served as adjuncts of the party apparatus.'
Moreover, international law has not always been fully embraced for domestic application even by constitutional democracies that have a jurisprudence
27. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
2.
28. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; 28 U.S.C. § 133 1(a) (1989). Concerning customary international law in
federal courts, see RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § Il1.
29. See KONST. SSSR arts. 128, 131(6) (1977) (Council of Ministers, as highest executive and administrative body of state authority of USSR, to take measures to ensure fulfillment of USSR's international
treaties).
30. See Law on the Procedure for the Conclusion, Execution, and Denunciation of International Treaties
of the USSR, art. 21, translatedin W. BUTLER, BASIC DOCUMENTS ON THE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM 290
(2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter Law on Treatiesl.
31. A recent article states:
The view is widespread that Soviet courts generally never take decisions on the basis of norms
of international law. It is true that up to the present, by virtue of the decidedly autarkic tendencies
of our society as a whole and the "impenetrability" of our legal order in particular, this took place
rarely, but in the case of questions of international transportation or the rendering of juridical
assistance in civil, family, and criminal matters, our courts took decisions on the basis of norms
of international treaties.
Vereshchetin, Danilenko & Mullerson, supra note 4, at 15-16. The recently published 1 KURS MEZHDUNARODNOGO PRAVA (International Law Course) 299-300 (R. Mullerson & G. Tunkin eds. 1989), gives several
examples of the application in Soviet courts of an agreement on international rail freight transportation
concluded among socialist countries. See also R. MULLERSON, SOOTNOSHENIE MEZHDUNARODNOGO I
NATSIONAL'NOGO PRAVA (The Relationship Between International and National Law) 76-77 (1982)
[hereinafter SOOTNOSHENIEI (citing the same examples).
32. See Berman, The Comparison of Soviet and American Law, 34 IND. L.J. 559, 567 (1959).
33. See infra text accompanying notes 46-53.
34. See Quigley, Law Reform and the Soviet Courts, 28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 59, 67-69 (1990).
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rooted in the rule of law. While most states share some resistance to infringements upon sovereignty imposed by international law, Soviet jurists and
diplomats have insisted to an almost paranoiac degree on maintaining doctrinal
dogmas and procedural safeguards in order to prevent international legal
obligations from being imposed on or applied against the Soviet Union, unless
and until the duly authorized organs of the Soviet state have given formal
consent.3 5 In contrast to the West, where direct judicial application of customary international law is well established, 36 Soviet courts have never applied
custom as a source of law.
There is no overarching principle in Soviet law to resolve conflicts between
international and domestic law.37 Instead, there are piecemeal answers, found
in some dozens of separate laws that refer to international treaties. 38 Thus,
there is no "later-in-time" rule comparable to the one endorsed by the U.S.
35. Thus, Soviet doctrine has traditionally favored treaties over custom as sources of international law.
See G. TuNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 133-37 (1974). Some commentators have identified the
Soviet Union as strictly "dualistic" in its approach to the relationship between international and domestic
law-that is, that it maintains a rigid separation between the two bodies of law unless and until the
occurrence of an appropriate act that brings an international rule into the domestic system. A number of
Soviet scholars reject this characterization, however. For an exposition of the trends among Soviet international lawyers, see KURS MEZHDUNARODNOGO PRAVA, supra note 31, at 272-82, 292-303; see also NV.
BUTLER, SOVIET LAW 397-98 (2d ed. 1988) (and authorities cited therein); SOOTNOSHENIE, supra note 31,
at 75-82; Ginsburgs, The Validity of Treaties in the MunicipalLaw of the "Socialist"States, 59 AM. J. INT'L
L. 523, 526-27 (1965). Traces may be found in Soviet writings of the idea that Soviet courts must apply
international treaties in certain kinds of cases, regardless of the existence of an act transforming an
international rule into a domestically applicable one. See I. BLISHCHENKO, MEZHDUNARODNOE I
VNUTRIGOSUDARSTVENNOE PRAVO 230 (1960) (International and Internal Law), quoted in W. BUTLER, supra,
at 397 ("[A] national law and an international treaty have equal force on the territory of a State, and...
national courts are obliged to apply the international treaty just as a national law on the territory of the
State."). But in view of the highly circumscribed sphere in which international treaties have actually been
used as a judicial rule of decision, the Soviet approach contrasts sharply with that of a number of states,
including the United States, that consider international law to be part of the "law of the land."
A trend that may eventually prove *relevant to the application of international law in Soviet courts is
the effort to involve the Soviet legislature more directly and substantially in foreign policy in general, and
in the treaty process in particular. The extent to which the legislature will exercise oversight or control over
the treaty process is still evolving. Soviet experts in international law have stressed the importance of
bringing about the continuous and substantive involvement of the legislative branch in Soviet foreign
policy-in particular, by specifying in the Constitution the types of treaties that would require parliamentary
approval. See Vereshchetin & Mullerson, supra note 4, at 17. If legislative participation in treatymaking
becomes meaningful, there could be tangible gains for the democratization of Soviet foreign relations, and
the possibilities for applying international treaties as part of domestic law might be enhanced.
36. See Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
37. Neither the Soviet Constitution nor the Law on Treaties, supranote 30, contains any universal rule
on resolving such conflicts. Rather, some 20 separate laws specify that they are to be interpreted in
conformity with Soviet obligations under international treaties, but this is not all laws. See Ametistov,
Problems of Relations Between Internationaland National Law, and Burchak, IncorporatingInternational
Law into Domestic Law, both reprintedin THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE ON LAW AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION: FACULTY PRESENTATIONS 55, 57 (1990). But see W. BUTLER, supra note 35, at 397-98 (suggesting
that the approach of according priority to international treaty obligations "would seem to represent a general
statement of principle in Soviet law," but noting that because the approach is embodied only in some statutes
and not in others, it may represent "a reserve guarantee in certain specific types of social relations rather
than a universal rule in Soviet law"): see also Ginsburgs, supra note 35, at 540-43.
38. Examples of laws providing for the priority of international treaties, as well as of laws omitting
any such provision, are given in W. BUTLER, supra note 35, at 398; see also Burchak, supra note 37, at
58.
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Supreme Court more than a century ago for resolving conflicts between treaties
and federal statutes, 39 nor is there anything like the approach of certain European countries, according to which international obligations are given hierarchical priority over domestic sources of law." Recently, certain Soviet scholars
have expressed unhappiness with this state of affairs and have argued for a
general rule establishing the priority of international obligations over conflicting
domestic rules.41

Further complications stem from the current anarchic state of affairs between the Union on the one hand and the Soviet republics and subunits on the
other. Until recently, there was no question of conflict between national policy
embodied in a Soviet treaty and republican or local policy, because the central
government had ample authority to declare and implement policy for the
country as a whole.42 With the exception of treaties adopted separately by the
Ukraine and Byelorussia as U.N. members,43 international treaties have entered
into force for the USSR by virtue of undertakings made at the Union level. In
declarations of sovereignty adopted within the last few years, however, most
of the republics and a variety of smaller entities have denied the authority of
the Union to impose law on them without their consent or over their explicit
objections. 4 If the disintegrative tendencies continue, the republics may begin
to "pick and choose" among treaties according to the level of support that they
enjoy within the republic. In that event, human rights treaties may actually be
more likely to enjoy acceptance within the republics than other Soviet treaties.
A striking pattern has emerged under which the sovereignty declarations and

39. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888). But see NV.BUTLER, supra note 35, at 397
(citing Blishchenko to the effect that in event of a conflict between national legislation and an international
treaty, "the enactment last in time governs").
40. See examples from European constitutions cited in L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMIT,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 141-44 (2d ed. 1987). European models are surveyed for
possible application in the Soviet Union in Vereshchetin, Danilenko & Mullerson, supra note 4, at 14-16.
41. Vereshchetin, Danilenko & Mullerson, supra note 4, at 16-17. For discussion of the role of the
newly created Committee ofConstitutional Supervision in reviewing legislation for conformity to international human rights law, see infra text accompanying notes 54-71.
42. Although Soviet and American federalism differ markedly, under both systems the central
government has enjoyed primacy in the field of foreign relations; treaties made by the USSR or by the
United States would prevail over any conflicting law or policy of the Soviet republics or the American states.
See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; cf. Law on Treaties, supra note 30, art. 21. Under Article 80 of the 1977
Constitution, the Union republics are given certain international powers denied to the states of the United
States, including the right to conclude treaties, cf. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1, but in practice there has
been complete subordination of the republics to the Union in the field of external relations. In the cases
in which certain Union republics did enter into international treaties, see infra note 43 concerning treaties
of the Ukraine and Byelorussia, the Union itself has been a party to the same treaty. The discussion above
concerning judicial implementation of treaties applies generally to all Soviet courts, including those in the
republics. In contrast to the United States, where the supremacy clause directs state judges to apply treaties
as the law of the land, courts in the Soviet republics have applied treaties only to the limited extent outlined
above.
43. These two Soviet republics are parties to the same U.N.-sponsored human rights treaties as the
USSR itself. See HUMAN RIGHTS: STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 15.
44. The declarations take various forms and do not necessarily purport to oust all Soviet laws. Examples
of the declarations are cited itfra note 45.
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constitutional drafts of the various republics give special prominence to norms
of international law protecting human rights.4 5
B. Current Trends in the USSR
With this overview of Soviet approaches to problems in the domestic
application of international law, let us now consider some of the developments
since Mikhail Gorbachev set in motion far-reaching changes in the domestic
and foreign policies of the Soviet Union. Along with perestroikaand glasnost',
the Soviet leadership under Gorbachev committed itself to the building of a
state based on law-pravovoe gosudarstvo in Russian. 6 The commitment
involves a major change in philosophical orientation that travels some distance
toward the use of law to curb arbitrariness and abuses of power. While recent
developments have called into question the willingness and ability of the Soviet
regime to fulfill this commitment, it remains a key element of the articulated
program of the Soviet leadership47 as well as of the various republics.48
45. The following examples illustrate the emphasis on international protection of human rights in
declarations and constitutions recently adopted or proposed by the republics:
Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR), Declaration on the State Sovereignty of the
RSFSR: "10. AU citizens [and other persons] are guaranteed the rights and freedoms envisaged by the
RSFSR Constitution, the USSR Constitution, and universally recognized norms of international law." Foreign
Broadcast Information Service, Soviet Union 90-115, June 14, 1990, at 102, 103 [service hereinafter FBISSOV1; see also id. at point 14 ("The RSFSR states its adherence to the universally recognized principles
").
of international law ....
RSFSR, Draft Constitution, art. 1.3(2) (on file with author): "Human rights in the Russian Federation
are guaranteed in conformity with generally recognized principles and norms of international law."
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Declaration on the Ukraine's State Sovereignty:
IV. [Citizens of the Ukrainian SSR] are guaranteed rights and freedoms envisaged by the
constitution of the Ukrainian SSR and norms of international law recognized by the Ukrainian
SSR ....
X .... The Ukrainian SSR admits the superiority of human values over class values, and
the priority of generally-acknowledged norms of international law over norms of inner state law.
FBIS-SOV 90-139, July 19, 1990, at 90-91.
Latvian Declaration of Independence: "[T]he Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet decides: 1. To recognize
the priority of basic principles of international law over the norms of state rights ....
8. To guarantee to [citizens and permanent residents of Latvia] political liberties corresponding to
generally recognized international human rights norms." FBIS-SOV 90-088, May 7, 1990, at 99-101.
Estonian Constitution:
The provisions of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and of other international pacts and declarations on the protection of human rights and civil rights, which have received universal recognition
among states of the world and have been ratified by the USSR, are an inalienable part of the legal
system of the Estonian Republic.
Law on the Introduction of Changes and Additions into the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Estonian
USSR, quoted in Juviler, GuaranteeingHuman Rights in the Soviet Context, 28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 133, 139 n.25 (1990).
46. On the concept of pravovoe gosttdarstro,see generally HELSINKI WATCH, TOWARD THE RULE OF
LAW: SOVIET LEGAL REFORM & HUmiAN RIGHTS UNDER PERESTROIKA 7 n.2 (1989); Beissinger, The Party
and the Rule ofLaw, 28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 41 (1990); Iakovlev, ConstitutionalSocialistDemocracy:
Dream or Reality?, 28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 117 (1990).
47. The draft of a new Union treaty proclaims that the uniting republics would "strive for the creation
of a rule-of-law state (pravo'oe gosudarstvo)." Union Treaty Draft, supra note 2, 5th point, at 4.
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On the international plane, the Soviet leadership has been pursuing a
program known as "new political thinking" (novoe politicheskoe myshlenie),
which has been articulated in major statements by Mikhail Gorbachev addressed
to the United Nations and to the international community as a whole 9
Gorbachev's speeches underscore that "it is necessary that national legislation
and administrative rules in the humanitarian sphere everywhere be brought in
accordance with international obligations and standards." 5 While aimed in
part at the problem of ensuring compliance by all states with agreed rules of
interstate conduct, Gorbachev's exhortation endorsing "a system of universal
law and order ensuring the primacy of international law in politics" 51 also
obviously applies to the international law of human rights.
Soviet legal scholars have elaborated the concept of "the primacy of international law in politics" in two mutually reinforcing directions; both are relevant
to the strengthening of the legal implementation of human rights. On the one
hand, the leading Soviet scholar of international law has asserted that the
domestic rule of law will lead to greater compliance with international law:
Beyond doubt a State in which democracy and legality predominate and
respect for human rights is ensured can be expected to respect international law in the international arena more than a State in which arbitrariness predominates. Therefore, the existence of the greatest possible
number of rule-of-law States which can set the tone of international life
is an important
prerequisite for the primacy of international law in
52
politics.
Viewing the linkage from the other direction, Soviet jurists have also emphasized that establishing the primacy of international human rights law could help
consolidate the domestic rule of law within the Soviet Union.5 3
Tangible actions have been taken to integrate the pravovoe gosudarstvo
program with international human rights. Of potentially great significance is
the creation of a Committee of Constitutional Supervision that has the authority
to review legislation and other normative acts for their conformity both to the

48. See, e.g., Article 1.1 of the Draft Constitution for the RSFSR, supra note 45, which provides as
its first proposition that the "Russian Federation is a sovereign, democratic, social, and law-based state
(pravovoe gosudarstvo) .... "
49. The first such speech was published in Pravda and izvestiia on September 17, 1987 and was
subsequently circulated as a U.N. document. The address given on December 7, 1988 to the U.N. General
Assembly is published as U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., 72d plen. mtg., at 2, U.N. Doc. A/43/PV.72 (1988). Of
the many important elements of this program, which include the development of a comprehensive system
of global security through the United Nations, I will be concerned here only with those that pertain to the
enhancement of human rights and the rule of law.
50. Pravda, Sept. 17, 1987, at 1.
51. Id. at 1.
52. Tunkin, On the Primacy ofInternationalLaw in Politics, in PERESTROIKA AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 5, 9 (W. Butler ed. 1990).
53. See Vereshchetin & Mullerson, supra note 4, at 9-10.
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Soviet Constitution and, interestingly, to international human rights norms. 4
While not a court,5 5 the Committee represents an important step toward applying constitutional control to institutions of governmental power. Although this
system differs from the U.S. model in several key respects, including the fact
that the Soviet legislature may overrule the Committee's findings5 6 the potential of the Committee should not be minimized.
In the area of international human rights law, the Committee may exercise
supervisory control according to the following provisions:
Art. 18.... A conclusion of the [Committee] contains a finding as
to whether the act, draft act or individual provisions thereof does or
does not conform to the USSR Constitution or the USSR laws, or, when
appropriate,to the USSR's internationalcommitments as well.
Art. 21.... A conclusion of the [Committee] stating that a particular normative legal act or individual provisions thereof violates basic
human rights and liberties codified in the USSR Constitution and in
internationalacts to which the USSR is a party entails the voiding of
this act or individual provisions thereof from the moment that the
Committee's conclusion is adopted. 7
54. Law on Constitutional Review, 42 CURRENT DIG. SOvIET PREss, No. 9, Apr. 4, 1990, at 13,
translatedfrom Pravda, Dec. 26, 1989, at 3, and Izvestiia, Dec. 26, 1989, at 1, 3. The cited translation uses
the term "Constitutional Review Committee" to refer to the body that I have called the Committee of
Constitutional Supervision. The term "Supervision" is semantically closer to the Russian nadzor (from the
roots for "over" and "see") and avoids connotations of the term "review" in U.S. constitutional jurisprudence. See text accompanying note 56 infra.
55. To date, no powers of constitutional review have been vested in Soviet courts, but there is ongoing
debate over whether such a reform should be instituted. In a recent speech in Washington, D.C., Yevgeny
Smolentsev, chairman of the USSR Supreme Court, stated: "Many Soviet jurists including myself do believe
that the power of constitutional review should be vested in the highest judicial tribunal of the nation." An
Evolving System of Soviet Justice, Legal Times, Sept. 17, 1990, at 15; see also Iakovlev, supra note 46,
at 127-28 (recommending that highest courts of union republics should perform review for constitutionality).
56. See Law on Constitutional Review, supra note 54, arts. 19-22. The Committee's advice that an
act is unconstitutional has the effect of suspending its operation, but the Committee's conclusions may be
rejected by the Soviet legislature, with the Congress of People's Deputies having the final decision. Advice
may be rendered on draft laws as well as on acts that have already entered into force. Concerning the effect
of advice that an act violates international obligations of the USSR, see infra text accompanying note 71.
57. Law on Constitutional Review, supra note 54, arts. 18, 21 (emphasis added). The Committee also
has authority to review treaties for conformity to the Constitution, pursuant to the following provisions of
the Law on Constitutional Review:
Art. 10. [The Committee] exercises review over the conformity to the USSR Constitution and
to USSR laws adopted by the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet
of ... international treaty and other commitments of the USSR and the Union republics that are
presented for ratification or confirmation.
Art. 12. [The Committee] accepts a question for consideration... (4) [under specified instructions
from organs empowered to request opinions] with respect to... international treaty and other commitments of the USSR and the Union republics.
Id. arts. 10, 12. Conceivably, the Committee could find that a treaty proposed for ratification (or possibly
even one that has already been ratified) would violate the Soviet Constitution. Such a finding could have
either positive or negative implications for the protection of human rights within the Soviet Union, depending
on the nature of the treaty in question and the constitutional provision invoked against it. If the Committee
finds that an actual or proposed treaty would violate the Soviet Constitution, the nonconformity could be
resolved by changing the Constitution, which is easier to do in the Soviet system than in the American
system.
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In its first six months of operation the Committee has relied on international
norms protecting human rights in more than half of its decisions,5 8 including
the following:
Labor disputes-judicialappeals:9 The Committee took note of Articles
7 and 8 of the Universal Declaration and Article 2(3)(b) of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, concerning equality of rights before the
law and the right of every person to an effective remedy for violation of rights.
Residence permits: 0 The Committee cited Article 13 of the Universal
Declaration and Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, concerning freedom of movement and choice of residence within a state,
and underscored that the International Covenant also governs the derogability
of these rights. The Committee also referred to the international principle of
equal access to education and noted that prolonged division of families would
violate not only the Soviet Constitution and laws, but also international norms.
Presumption of innocence:" The Committee took note of Article 11(1) of
the Universal Declaration and Article 14(2) of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, concerning the right of every accused to be presumed
innocent until proven guilty according to law in a public trial.
Alcoholism and drug addiction:2 The Committee considered that measures
for compulsory treatment in health facilities conflicted with Article 2(3)(a) of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, concerning the right
to an effective remedy for the violation of rights. The Committee also found
a violation of Article 7(d) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social
58. Decisions of the Committee are published in Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR and are cited
below according to their 1990 Vedomosti item number.
At its first official meeting, the Committee decided to consider four questions on its own initiative,
and two of these involved examination of international human rights obligations. See Stepovoi, Constitutional
Committee Makes Decisions,42 CURRENT DIG. SOVIET PRESS, No. 37, Oct. 17, 1990, at 27, translatedfrom
Izvestiia, Sept. 15, 1990, at 1; Stepovoi, Guarding the Constitution, 42 CURRENT DIG. SOVIET PRESS, No.
20, June 20, 1990, at 26, translatedfrom Izvestiia, May 16, 1990, at 2.
During the first six months of operation, the Committee considered a total of 10 decisions; 7 invoke
human rights norms. Each decision would merit a detailed discussion of the substance of the rights addressed, as well as of such questions as the basis on which the Committee's jurisdiction was invoked and
the treatment of the relationship between constitutional jurisprudence and other sources of law. Specialists
in international human rights law might well find the substance of some of the Committee's decisions
surprising and perhaps even overly zealous. My comments must be confined to the aspects of the published
decisions that specifically cite international obligations concerning human rights.
59. 2 Vedomosti SSSR, No. 27, item 524 (1990). In discussing this decision in a press interview, the
deputy chairman of the Committee said that "international acts provide for exceptions with regard to court
appeals only for persons who hold posts of a political nature or posts requiring special confidentiality."
Constitutional Court Status Urged, FBIS-SOV 90-244, Dec. 19, 1990, at 49, 50.
60. 2 Vedomosti SSSR, No. 39, item 773 (1990); 2 Vedomosti SSSR, item 1004 (1990); see also
Committee Issues ConstitutionalityDecisions, FBIS-SOV 90-213, Nov. 2, 1990, at 40-41.
61. 2 Vedomosti SSSR, No. 39, item 775 (1990).
62. 2 Vedomosti SSSR, No. 47, item 1001 (1990). The deputy chairman of the Committee stated: "We
deemed the existing legislation on compulsory treatment for alcoholics does not comply with the USSR
Constitution and international law. Tens of thousands of sick people who have committed no crime are now
essentially being kept imprisoned." FBIS-SOV-90-244, Dec. 19, 1990, at 50; see also FBIS-SOV-90-213,
Nov. 2, 1990, at 40-41.
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and Cultural Rights, concerning rest, leisure, and periodic holidays with pay,
arising out of denial to workers of leave for treatment. Interestingly, with
respect to a measure purporting to require Soviet citizens to take care of their
health, the Committee said that "such an obligation is not provided for in the
Constitution of the USSR, nor in international acts on human rights, and cannot
be secured by measures of a compulsory character."
RSFSR prohibitionon joint holding of posts:6" The Committee examined
legislation of the Russian Republic that prohibited holding a leadership position
in any governmental organ while simultaneously fulfilling any other responsibility, including with respect to political or social organizations. The Committee
found conflicts with the following international acts: Articles 22 and 25 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, concerning rights of free
association and rights to take part in government and to be elected to office;
Article 8 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, concerning the right to form trade unions; Articles 2, 3, and 8 of a
convention of the International Labor Organization concerning freedom of
64
association; and Articles 7.5 and 7.9 of the CSCE Copenhagen Document.
Unpublished acts concerning rights, freedoms, and obligations:5 The
Committee referred to "international acts on human rights" in ruling that
normative acts touching on rights and obligations must be published.
In every case to date in which the Committee has relied on international
instruments, it has done so in reference to parallel provisions in the Soviet
Constitution; no case has yet rested on international human rights law alone.6
Placing international human rights law alongside the Soviet Constitution tends
to demonstrate their congruence; the two sources of rights mutually reinforce
each other. Significantly, however, the Committee's work also indicates a
willingness to construe the Soviet Constitution in a manner that will promote
its consistency with international legal obligations. Accordingly, the Committee
63. 2 Vedomosti SSSR, No. 47, item 1002 (1990). The deputy chairman of the Committee said: "I
would particularly single out our committee's negative conclusion on the decision by the [RSFSR legislature]
banning the joint holding of the posts of leaders of a state organ of power or management with any other
post, including political or sociopolitical organizations .... [Sluch a ban is regarded by international pacts
as inadmissible discrimination on political grounds." FBIS-SOV 90-244, Dec. 19, 1990, at 50; see also
FBIS-SOV 90-213, Nov. 2, 1990, at 40-41.
64. Supra note 21.
65. 2 Vedomosti SSSR, No. 50, item 1080 (1990).
66. The significance of this pattern may become clearer as the Committee's work proceeds. At this
early stage, I would venture the tentative hypothesis that the Committee desires to place primary emphasis
on the Soviet Constitution in order to strengthen respect for that document and to aid in inculcating a culture
of constitutional review.
In some of the cases referred to above, international instruments are cited in the paragraphs leading
up to the dispositive paragraphs, while the dispositifis formulated in terms of nonconformity to the relevant
constitutional provision. Examples are the decisions on labor disputes and on presumption of innocence.
See supra notes 59, 61 and accompanying text. In other cases, however, both the preambular material and
the dispositif cite international documents. Examples include the alcoholism decision, see supra note 62
and accompanying text, and the decision concerning the RSFSR ban on joint posts, see supra note 63 and
accompanying text.
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has drawn attention to provisions of international instruments that are more
specific or more protective of rights than the Soviet Constitution.67
An important issue is whether the Committee's jurisdiction over international human rights matters extends beyond formally ratified treaties to include the
conformity of domestic acts with the Soviet Union's commitments made in the
Universal Declaration and in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in
Europe, including at the Helsinki, Vienna, and Copenhagen meetings.68 Despite the reluctance of the signatories to undertake legally binding commitments
at the time of adoption of these documents, the Soviet Union has apparently
moved a long way toward giving them legal force through the domestic institution of the Committee. The law defining the Committee's jurisdiction uses
formulations with respect to international obligations that appear on their face
to go beyond ratified treaties.69 The Committee has taken a generous view of
its own mandate and has considered various sorts of "international acts,"
including the Universal Declaration and CSCE documents.7"
According to Article 21 of the Committee's statute, a finding of a violation
of "basic human rights and liberties codified in the USSR Constitution and in
international acts" entails the "voiding" of the domestic act. In other cases,
according to the same Article, the domestic act is suspended until the indicated
nonconformity is removed.7"
III.

JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

67. An example is the decision on residence permits, see supra note 60 and accompanying text, which
quoted verbatim the provision of the International Civil and Political Covenant stressing that the rights to
freedom of movement and free choice of residence "shall not be subject to any restrictions except those
which are provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order (ordre public), public
health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights recognized
in the present Covenant."
68. As noted supranote 22, these instruments have generally been viewed as embodying political rather
than legal commitments, and the Soviet Union (like other states, including the United States) has endorsed
them without all the formalities of treaty ratification.
69. The terms "international commitments" and "international acts," used in the provisions quoted in
text accompanying note 57 supra, are consistent with this broader interpretation.
70. The ruling on the RSFSR ban on joint posts, see supra note 63 and accompanying text, cited the
Copenhagen Document, supra note 21.
71. It is not clear whether the provisions that authorize the legislature to overrule the Committee's
conclusions of nonconformity apply when the offending domestic act is "voided" for noncompliance with
international human rights law; the act is open to the interpretation that such conclusions would be definitive
and not merely advisory. Arguably, Article 22, which provides for the possibility of rejection of the
Committee's conclusions by specified votes of the legislature, does not apply in cases where the nonconformity pertains to domestic acts in violation of "international acts to which the USSR is a party" concerning
"basic human rights and liberties." This interpretation is supported both by the distinction between "suspension" and "voiding" found in Article 21, and by the fact that Article 22 refers only to nonconformities with
"the USSR Constitution or a USSR law," not to nonconformities with international acts concerning human
rights. Proposals for clarifying and strengthening the role of the Committee with respect to its authority in
the sphere of international human rights have been made by experts in international law. See, e.g., Vereshchetin, Danilenko & Mullerson, supra note 4, at 18.
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I believe that the effort to build a law-based state in the Soviet Union (or
successor entities) should go beyond the limited constitutional review described
above. Soviet courts should give direct effect to international human rights law,
and could do so consistently with contemporary Soviet notions of legitimacy.
In making this suggestion, I am well aware that the United States has not yet
gone very far down this path. It is perhaps ironic that the Soviet Union may
be poised for greater progress toward domestic application of international
human rights law than is the United States. U.S. ratification of comprehensive
human rights treaties would, of course, lend greater legitimacy to judicial
application of international human rights law here.
Considerations of both an institutional and a substantive character underlie
my position that Soviet courts should apply international human rights law. On
the institutional level, I believe that there are parallel and complementary roles
for courts and for the Committee on Constitutional Supervision; reliance on the
latter will not suffice to ensure compliance with international obligations.72
Important as the Committee on Constitutional Supervision may be (or may
become), its jurisdiction cannot be invoked by the ordinary citizen affected by
governmental action. Rather, only certain designated organs and officials may
request the Committee to take up a matter.73 Judicial remedies should be
structured so that the individual can apply to a body in or near her own home74
town for redress against unlawful official action.
Undoubtedly, the Committee as an institution has certain advantages over
local courts in matters involving international law, and accordingly I stress that
the functions of the two organs must be complementary. It is to be expected-and early experience bears out this prediction-that members of the
72. Many have argued that constitutional control cannot achieve full effectiveness in the USSR unless
review for constitutionality is carried out by a court or courts. In current debates in the Soviet Union, some
have called for the constitutional review function to be lodged in the judiciary-at least in the Supreme
Court, if not the lower courts. The incumbent chairman and deputy chairman of the Committee on
Constitutional Supervision favor transformation of the Committee into a "Constitutional Court," and this
approach is taken in the draft Union Treaty now under discussion. See FBIS-SOV 90-238, Dec. 11, 1990,
at 41,43; FBIS-SOV 90-244, Dec. 19, 1990, at 49-50. While this Essay is not the place to explore the issues
concerning different forms of constitutional review and their suitability for the Soviet Union, I would
underscore the important role of courts in ensuring legality of official action wholly apart from the question
of which body or bodies should have authority to review legislative acts for constitutionality.
73. Questions may be submitted to the Committee by the Congress of People's Deputies and the
Supreme Soviet or certain subgroups and officials thereof, by the Union republics' supreme bodies of state
power, and by certain executive and judicial organs and other designated bodies. There is also a procedure
for the Committee to take up questions on its own initiative. See Law on Constitutional Review, supra note
54, arts. 12-13. The USSR President also may present questions to the Committee. See Law on Establishing
the Post of President of the USSR and Making Changes to the USSR Constitution, 42 CURRENT DIG. SOVIET
PRESS, No. 14, May 9, 1990, at 20, translatedfrom Pravda, Mar. 16, 1990, at 1, 3 and Izvestiia, Mar. 16,
1990, at 2-3 (amending Article 124 of Constitution). This jurisdictional feature was a deliberate policy
choice, and I do not think that it should be revisited at this early stage. Eventually it may become possible
to consider broadening the jurisdiction of the Committee (or court that succeeds to its functions) to include
review for constittionalityupon the petition of individuals along the American model, but this issue should
be kept analytically distinct from the issue of supervision of governmental action discussed in the text.
74. It would not be advisable to overwhelm the Committee with petitions from all over the country,
nor to require individuals to apply to Moscow for review of actions of local authorities.

2330

The Yale Law Journal

[Vol. 100: 2315

Committee will be elite professionals, who are relatively much more likely than
the average judge to have had exposure to the jurisprudence and culture of
international human rights (including, among other things, by virtue of contacts
with foreign lawyers). 75 Moreover, the establishment of the Committee has
taken place with careful attention to structural features conducive to independent judgment,76 while the work of attempting to reconstruct the Soviet judiciary in the interests of independence is just beginning. One may envision the
eventual evolution of a system under which the Committee, or a successor court
of comparable centralized character, would elucidate principles weaving international human rights law into the fabric of Soviet jurisprudence (constitutional
and otherwise), and courts throughout the country would then apply those
principles to the myriad concrete cases that come before them.
On the substantive level, review of official actions for conformity to
international law would strengthen the level of protection for individuals beyond
that provided by the Soviet Constitution and laws. The international human
rights documents endorsed by the USSR are more detailed and demanding than
the relevant provisions of the Soviet Constitution. International human rights
law resists the tendency of Soviet constitutional law to place the interests of
the state above the rights of individuals.7 7 While comprehensive reform of the
Soviet Constitution and laws to eliminate inconsistencies with international
human rights law theoretically would be possible, acknowledging the priority
of international human rights law over contrary domestic acts could accomplish
the same result in a simpler and more straightforward fashion.7 8
The reasons why Soviet jurisprudence to date has not been receptive to the
direct application of international law need not preclude judicial enforcement
of international human rights law in the future that is now unfolding. Here it
may be enlightening to contrast some aspects of the U.S. and Soviet attitudes
toward legitimacy of lawmaking and judicial activities, to the extent that they
may bear on domestic application of human rights law.
75. The author's views concerning the point in the text are shaped by recent encounters in Moscow
and New York with a variety of Soviet legal and judicial personnel.
76. The Committee's chairman has drawn attention to the importance of structural features guaranteeing
the independence of the Committee, or future constitutional court, from any of the bodies whose work it
might supervise. FBIS-SOV 90-238, Dec. 11,1990, at 42-43.
77. Compare the general exception in Article 39 of the Soviet Constitution ("Enjoyment by citizens
of their rights and freedoms must not be to the detriment of the interests of society or the state, or infringe
the rights of other citizens.") with, e.g., Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(containing carefully circumscribed derogations). See also KONsT. SSSR arts. 59, 62, 65 (1977). Developments in Soviet constitutional law may narrow the gap somewhat, but it is premature to be overly optimistic.
78. Cf. Vereshchetin, Danilenko & Mullerson, supra note 4, at 20 (recommending constitutional rule
that Soviet laws are to be applied in conformity with international obligations of USSR, including those
undertaken through Helsinki process); Vereshchetin & Mullerson, supra note 4, at 10 (noting huge task of
bringing Soviet legislation into conformity with international obligations).
The situation is thus quite different from that found in the United States, where judicial review is
available to individuals under substantive constitutional standards that are usually at least as rigorous as
the requirements of international law. The more effective an existing constitutional system in ensuring
enforcement of human rights, the less it needs to allow individuals to rest their claims on international law.
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As Professor Brilmayer underscores in this symposium, part of the reluctance of U.S. courts to apply international law may be attributable to a concern
over the absence of the majoritarian imprimatur that is the touchstone of
legitimacy in the American tradition. 9 International human rights law implicates this concern in problematic fashion. Those who resist applying international jurisprudence argue that human rights advocates should address their demands to the political branches instead of to the courts: until a mobilization of
constituencies in support of ratification of human rights treaties, the ordinary
outcome of political compromises within the United States would prevail.
Moreover, the subject matter of international human rights law includes areas
where controversy over constitutional review in the United States is already
quite acute. In recent death penalty cases,80 for example, human rights advocates invoked international jurisprudence in a sphere where passions already
ran high about the legitimacy of using "countermajoritarian" notions, not rooted
in constitutional text or original intent, to invalidate state statutes. In my view,
international human rights law is no more "countermajoritarian" than familiar
techniques of constitutional review," but its substantive scope is similar
enough to the Bill of Rights to bring ifito play all the anxieties about judicial
activism that surface in highly politicized contexts such as the death penalty.
By contrast, majoritarianism has not yet taken hold as the philosophy by
which the legitimacy of lawmaking activity should be judged in the Soviet
Union. To be sure, the political-legal reforms of the perestroika period have
placed greater emphasis on lawmaking by a quasi-representative legislature than
was the case during the decades when the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
enjoyed primacy both in the written constitution and in actuality. Developments
toward pluralism and majoritarianism in Soviet lawmaking are surely to be
applauded and encouraged-through international human rights law among
other means 82-- but until majoritarian institutions are firmly in place and
capable of producing legislation reflective of the will of the majority of the
electorate, legitimacy must be judged by criteria other than parliamentary
endorsement. The "majoritarian" credentials of the Soviet Parliament to date
must be viewed with considerable skepticism, not only on formal grounds
pertaining to the methods for selection of members of its chambers, but also
because of the intense struggle over whether any political body at the level of
79. Brilmayer, InternationalLaw in American Courts: A Modest Proposal,100 YALE L.J. 2277, 228183 (1991).
80. E.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989): Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
81. Justice O'Connor's ambivalence in the two juvenile death penalty cases cited supra notes 24 and
80 is suggestive. Would contemporary majorities in state legislatures really vote to impose the death penalty
on teenagers, especially if they knew that the overwhelming trend-not only in advanced democracies, but
in the world at large-is to the contrary?
82. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 7, art. 21(3); International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 9, art. 25; CopenhagenDocument, supra note 21, paras. 3,5.1-5.4
(all providing, with varying degrees of specificity, for government based on will of people expressed through
periodic and genuine elections).
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"the Union" can reflect the will of the constituent peoples who clamor for
reallocation of effective power to the republics or even smaller units. In the
absence of political institutions that meaningfully represent working majorities,
the "countermajoritarian" objection to judicial activity is misplaced. 83 Indeed,
the very weakness of majoritarian processes to date makes it all the more
appropriate to consider whether courts could play a role in enforcing the civil
and political rights that form the foundation of a functioning democracy. 4
The old foundations of Soviet legitimacy have crumbled and new ones are
not yet established. It seems inappropriate in this time of profound political
change to argue from traditional premises about legitimacy that may not
respond to contemporary yearnings of the peoples of the Soviet Union. Thus,
I would not place too much weight on the fact that the use of Soviet human
rights treaties as a source of domestic law would be consistent with positivist
legal theories that have characterized Soviet jurisprudence in the past. To
illustrate the point, should we care very much that Soviet treaty obligations
were undertaken with all the formalities of state consent that conferred one kind
of legitimacy under the long-prevailing Soviet theory of legal obligation? Soviet
consent to international human rights documents represented a powerful rhetorical point during the period of strenuous efforts to induce compliance with them,
but in my opinion governmental consent, without more, is of dubious relevance
in the current period of revolutionary change. The fact that their rulers once
consented to a legal norm does not suffice to legitimate the norm in the eyes
of the Soviet peoples today. The basis for the legitimacy of international human
rights law is that it expresses fundamental values which enjoy support from the
peoples of the Soviet Union in the present and for the enduring future;85 legitimacy derives from the moral force of the content of the norms, and not from
historically grounded consent.
If Soviet courts were to begin to apply international human rights law and
were to encounter acquiescence or perhaps even applause, the effort could be
self-legitimizing. It is not necessarily farfetched to suggest that the Soviet
83. Thus, I disagree with the U.S. Attorney General, who has written:
Whether judicial review is conducted by a court or by a [Committee of Constitutional
Supervision], a "Madisonian dilemma" arises, whereby a nonelected body would be empowered to nullify democratically promulgated legislation. After years of absolutism one
temptation inexorably facing the newjudiciary or [Committee] would be to advance reforms
beyond those contained in legislation. However, it is democracy and the rule of consent by
the governed that legitimizes any law. Any judicial review extending or rejecting legislation
based on the vision, no matter how well-meaning, of one individual or group of individuals
acting as Platonic guardians could weaken the rule of law, the democratic spirit, and even
the legitimacy of the new Soviet regime.
Thornburgh, The Soviet Union andthe Rule of Law, FOREIGN AFF., Spring 1990, at 13, 21-22. This passage
assumes the existence of viable Soviet democratic institutions-an assumption that will be questionable for
some time into the future-and also overlooks the potential role of courts (or the Committee of Constitutional Supervision) in strengthening majoritarian processes.
84. Cf. L ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) (articulating a role for courts in strengthening
democratic processes).
85. See supra note 45 (declarations of sovereignty and related documents).
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people might embrace judicial application of international human rights law as
more congenial to their current needs than the circumscribed role that courts
have played in Soviet society in the past. 86 To be sure, no movement in this
direction will be successful in the absence of a considerable strengthening of
independence of the judiciary and cultivation of a legal culture of judicial
supervision of official action. But if the fledgling efforts at judicial reform take
root and flourish, Soviet judges might look to international human rights
law-which after all is fully codified and readily accessible-as the society
gropes for new institutions to strengthen the rule of law.
CONCLUSION: A CHALLENGE FOR THE UNITED STATES?
The end of the Cold War provides an ideal opportunity for reconsidering
the problem of the application of international human rights law in the United
States. Professor Brilmayer's article takes a step in the right direction by
focusing attention on the propriety of judicial consideration of relations between
the state and the individual, and by dispelling some of the spurious objections
to judicial enforcement of international law that surface from time to time. Her
refutation of "countermajoritarian objections" to judicial application of international law is compelling; indeed, she might have added that in recent cases in
which claimants sought to rely on international human rights law in U.S. courts,
the challenged policies were not those of Congress but of executive agencies
or of state legislatures acting ambiguously in the far-distant past.8 7 International human rights law presents the kinds of "vertical" issues 8 that should be
well-suited for judicial application in the United States, in cases based on
customary international law as well as in treaty cases.
While I personally favor an active role for U.S. courts in applying and
thereby shaping customary international law, I also believe that there is much
to be gained by endorsing the written expression of international human rights
law through the treaty vehicle. Action by the Senate on the human rights
treaties that have been pending before it for more than a decade would give
aggrieved persons a surer remedy than now exists in the current state of

86.
Soviet legal scholarship has always emphasized that international human rights treaties obligate
signatories to ensure the applicable human rights and freedoms. However, until now, Soviet
scholars have unjustifiably advocated that these documents do not represent rights directly
enforceable by the individual. This approach has been excessively legalistic. A citizen of a state
based on the rule of law has the right to demand that state agencies observe voluntarily adopted
international obligations which directly affect the individual's interests.
Vereshchetin & Mullerson, InternationalLaw in an Interdependent World, 28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
291, 300 (1990); Vereshchetin & Mullerson, supra note 4, at 10.
87. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 826-28 & n.26 (1988) (state legislation failed

to set minimum age for death penalty); id. at 849-55 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (expressing doubt that
contemporary state legislatures would vote to execute persons whose crimes were committed before age

16); Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Ferrer-Mazorra v. Meese, 479
U.S. 889 (1986) (challenging policy of Immigration & Naturalization Service).
88. See Brilmayer, supra note 79, at 2295-99 & passim.
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uncertainty about customary law. Furthermore, full U.S. participation in human
rights treaties is the best way to give us the moral and legal standing to influence trends toward enforcement of human rights in the former Soviet bloc.
U.S. skittishness about international human rights treaties has always
seemed irrational to me. It is not necessary here to rehearse the arguments of
proponents or opponents except to the extent that they may relate to Soviet
positions. In that connection, I would note the following selected aspects of the
arguments of some of the objectors. It has been said that the participation of
the Soviet Union and other autocratic states is ipsofacto proof of the worthlessness of these documents, because those states have hypocritically endorsed them
with no intention of compliance and no expectation of sanction for violation.
It has been said that international instruments embody socialistic notions that
are not really "rights" at all, such as the "right" to a job or to social security
or to education or to health care. It has also been said that the Soviet Union
and other antagonists of the United States would exploit U.S. adherence for
propagandistic uses of their own, as by fomenting dissension in Puerto Rico
or on American Indian reservations in the United States. By relying on these
and other arguments that presuppose continued ideological struggle between
two hostile blocs, opponents have prevented the most important human rights
treaties from becoming part of "the supreme Law of the Land,"8 9 and the few
that have been allowed to squeak by are fettered with debilitating reservations
aimed at minimizing their effectiveness as law in the United States. 90
These objections never withstood scrutiny even during the height of the
Cold War, and today they carry no force whatsoever. The Soviet Union, after
years of paying mere lip service to human rights instruments, is now starting
to take the obligations seriously. The human rights idea has revolutionized the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and the need to strengthen the legal mechanisms for giving effect to that idea is urgent. By fully accepting international
human rights law as part of U.S. law, the United States can set a new standard
for emulation in the courts of its former nemesis.

89. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cI. 2.
90. The Senate's consent to ratification of the Genocide Convention contained the following reservation:
"[Nlothing in the Convention requires or authorizes legislation or other action by the United States of
America prohibited by the Constitution of the United States as interpreted by the United States." S. ExEc.
REP. No. 2, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1985), reprintedin 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 612, 621 (1986). The Senate
also took the view that the Genocide Convention should be non-self-executing; that is, it would not be
operative in U.S. courts apart from its implementing legislation. See id.

